Democrats may be swinging at Bush, but they're hitting our soldiers in the gut
The war in Iraq has, of course, been polarizing from its inception. Anti-war protests, “human shields,” and vocal recantings by formerly hawkish Democrats of the original intent of their votes to “use force” against Saddam Hussein presented, from the beginning, a divided American front in this second middle eastern war in fifteen years.Circumstances have not improved in the four years since America and her thirty-plus allies launched an operation which successfully deposed Saddam Hussein’s regime, but which failed to foresee, and secure Iraq against, the unleashing of terrorist acts and sectarian violence which have plagued that country since. The mainstream media has helped along the image of Iraq as a nationwide “death zone” by using the 24-hour news cycle to plaster images of violence and carnage from the region all over television sets across America. The “anti-war” crowd has become more shrill than ever – amidst their still-mystifying claim that they are being shut up by a totalitarian American government which will suffer no “dissent.” Democrats in Congress have now been saying for years that they were “lied to” by the President about prewar intelligence and the reasons for Saddam’s removal (even those on the Senate Intelligence Committee, who have unfettered access to the same intelligence that the President gets), or that they didn’t think that their vote authorizing the President to use force in Iraq would actually amount to anything more than the “threat of force” (emphasis added).
Faced with a potential disaster, both politically and on the ground in Iraq, President Bush announced weeks ago that, in a vigorous attempt to right the ship in that region, he was making four fundamental adjustments to the “strategy” currently being carried out.
First, Lt. General David Petraeus, PhD, Princeton graduate, former Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), former head of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (the command responsible for training Iraqi forces), and author of Army FM 23-4, “a field manual devoted exclusively to counterinsurgency operations” (emphasis added), was named Commander of Multinational Forces in Iraq, and tasked with putting his field manual into practice.
Second – and perhaps most important – the rules of engagement in Iraq were adjusted to provide for more effective targeting of insurgents and insurgent leaders (as well as forces from Iran). With this alteration in strategy, the troops on the ground can concentrate once again on rooting out and arresting or killing terrorists and insurgents, instead of having to completely restrict their operations, out of fear of upsetting the fragile Iraqi governing coalition (not to mention setting off a media firestorm, which is always a threat), to driving back and forth on the same IED-infested roads and performing the same “show of force” or security missions, day-in and day-out, with little to show for it except for more dead or wounded troops.
Third, more pressure was to be put on the Iraqi government to crack down on sectarian violence and on insurgent leaders like Muqtada al-Sadr, and to work harder and more quickly toward self-sufficience, both in governance and in security.
Fourth, in order to support the other three elements of his “new way forward in Iraq,” the President announced that a “surge” of 21,500 more troops would be sent to the Iraqi theater, both to secure Baghdad and to facilitate the implementation of LG Petraeus’s counterinsurgency, defense training, and stabilization plan.
Immediately attacked as an “escalation of the war in Iraq,” the troop surge became a hot-button issue from the moment that it was announced, and, since the advent of the 110th Congress, the situation – with regard to the surge and to the prospects for success in Iraq with what we have there already – has worsened considerably. Under new Democratic leadership (which campaigned, largely, on an anti-Iraq war platform), the House and Senate have both been increasingly vocal about their desire to derail the US efforts in Iraq. Whether out of the desire to “save the lives of future American soldiers,” or simply out of the long-held yearning defeat and disgrace the hated President Bush, attempts to hamstring current operations, and to prevent flexibility and adjustment in strategy going forward, have moved to front and center on Congressional Democrats’ agendae since taking over the legislative branch of government.
This frustratingly political – in the most pejorative sense possible – process began with the introduction, first in the Senate and then in the House, of non-binding resolutions condemning the President’s troop surge. The fact that these resolutions are non-binding has caused many defenders of Congressional Democrats to argue that there is no harm being done, either to the war effort or to troop morale (though the authors had to be forced to include language affirming that they do, in fact, “support the brave soldiers already in Iraq”), and say that these resolutions simply serve to send a message to the President that Congress disapproves of his handling of the war, and will be watching him closely from here on out.
They are correct on only one count: the resolutions do, in fact, send a message – but it’s not to the White House. The only people a non-binding resolution sends a message to are our troops and our enemies, letting the former know that the vital backing from their homeland — both in will and in finances — is on life-support, and telling the latter that the American front in this war is so fractured that our determination to keep fighting could evaporate at any time, leading not only to the sacrifice of our troops in-theater, but also to a future emboldening of this enemy that will make the heart they took from our fleeing Beirut and Mogadishu look like child’s play. Said Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in one of the rare public appearances he has made since being confirmed, “It's pretty clear that a resolution that in effect says that the general going out to take command of the arena shouldn't have the resources he thinks he needs to be successful certainly emboldens the enemy and our adversaries.” Neither our troops nor our enemies are stupid. They see, hear, and understand what is going on.
As if the previous situation was not enough, Rep. John Murtha (D-PA), former Marine, longtime antagonist of the soldiers and of America’s efforts in Iraq, and chairman of the defense subcommittee of the purse string-holding House Appropriations Committee, yesterday announced that the House Democratic leaders had joined forces with several leftist “anti-war” groups (such as the “Win without war coalition,” “Americans against the escalation of the war in Iraq,” and others) in a multi-faceted – legislative action combined with a multimillion dollar ad campaign – attempt to undermine the President’s authority as Commander in Chief of the nation’s fighting forces by “limiting the administration’s options” through the passage of legislation and the inclusion of several stipulations for receipt of funding in appropriations bills. The plan is being called a “slow-bleed strategy” – an apt title, given the nature of what is being fought over in this Democrat-spurred battle of politics and of posturing.
Caught in the middle of the posturing, the politics, the debate, and the rhetoric are America’s soldiers. Those who voluntarily put their lives on the line in some of the most dangerous places in the world, and who all too frequently make the ultimate sacrifice for their fellow man or for their mission, are being sent the most dangerous of messages by these actions.
Being told that one is not supported on a dangerous mission is one thing. It is another entirely to be bled slowly into a defeat. Our young soldiers of today haven’t seen this before, but veterans of Vietnam know it well. It’s the sinking feeling that you get when you are risking your life doing something you believe can lead to victory, but the people who you are doing it for not only don’t believe in what you’re doing, but don’t believe in you, either. Obviously, the full support of a united homeland is the best possible wartime scenario. However, if it is the case that the war is nor supported, and the political leadership in question has the courage to be honest about such a stance, and to act on their conviction, then that is not the biggest problem – stop the war, by whatever means necessary, and bring the troops home. The area may dissolve into chaos the moment they leave, but more Americans won’t be killed in the immediate future, and the politicians in Washington will, at least, have been honest about their desires, and will have followed through on them.
However, the current debate, and the current strategy of so many “leaders” in Washington – most of whom are Democrats, but some of whom are, unfortunately, Republicans – does the maximum amount of damage possible. The fact that the front at home is so horribly fractured that the party in control of the legislative branch of government would seek to “slowly bleed” the war effort until it is dry of funds with which to purchase bullets, body armor, and other supplies, and until the American public is whipped into such an “anti-war,” anti-military frenzy that Iraq war veterans are as reviled as Vietnam veterans were in their day – both sadly martyred on the pyre of public opinion and of anti-American sentiment – is unconscionable to the soldier in the field, who day in and day out faces the bombs, the bullets, and the hatred of those who would kill us all were it not for our proactive action around the globe.
Imagine attempting life-or-death activities, surrounded by those who wish you dead. Difficult, isn’t it? Now imagine attempting those activities while, at home, those in charge of your equipment, your orders, your options, and, ultimately, your lives, are arguing how much of each of those should be taken away, and, for the purpose of pride and of political gain, whether one or both of your hands should be tied behind your back.
In an ideal world (as ideal as a wartime world can be), the soldier in the field has but one goal in mind, of which there are two parts: to accomplish his mission, and to see to it that the men (or women) next to him return safely. When the message that comes from the home front is a loud and clear, “your mission may not matter any more tomorrow, because you’ll all be withdrawn regardless of conditions in-theater” – or, worse, “You have to continue these missions, but you must do so knowing that we are gradually turning off the spigot of action in this war, so whatever your task is, whether you survive or not, it is not for the successful achievement of any larger goal or objective” – can the soldier possibly feel good about his situation, or about what he is being asked to risk his life to do?
Such messages are the epitome of disastrousness, not only for the message that they send to those who willingly give their lives to save ours, or to serve the higher ideal for which they are fighting, but also for the message that they send to our enemies. Any argument to the contrary of this point is laughable at best. Those who would kill us hear the same statements that our people and our soldiers do – that this war effort will be “slowly bled” to death, and that our already splintered political leadership is wavering on the edge of a total withdrawal from the region. Any who do not think that such a message emboldens the enemy – who will naturally think that an increased effort, and more dead Americans, will only hasten the surrender of the power which Osama bin Laden called a “paper tiger” with no stomach for a long fight – is not living in a reality-based world.
The message which the out-of-touch politicians in Washington most need to receive is that every bit of political posturing, every effort to undermine the President’s leadership of the war, every attempt to hamstring the administration’s (and the military leadership’s) options in a war that requires flexibility, costs American (and Iraqi) lives. These attempts to score political victories cost real lives of real people – people who, due to the enlarged, overly ambitious egos of American politicians (and due to acts carried out for the simple reason of a hatred of the President), will never again return home to their families, will never live out their lives, and will never again have an opportunity to pursue their hopes and dreams like the rest of us at home will.
Our troops voluntarily put themselves in harm’s way, and they do so because of a higher ideal which they believe is worth the price not only of their time and their comfort, but of their lives. Scoring political points at the expense of these peoples’ lives is neither honorable nor acceptable, and if people think that the soldiers we have downrange do not correctly see these actions as being exactly that, then those folks belong firmly in the John Kerry camp of troop intelligence denial.
If our political leaders lack the stomach to do what is necessary to successfully complete a war against those who wish to destabilize a region and to kill us all, then they should follow that conviction to its only possible “honorable” end, and force a withdrawal of all troops, as soon as possible. Anything else not only shows the cowardice of not fighting for what they really believe, but sends the loud and clear message that there is no real support for our troops or for their mission on the home front – a message which tells our soldiers that their lives don’t matter for anything but to serve as pawns in a political game, and which tells our enemies that they have an ally in power in this country.
President Bush’s post-9/11 words hold even more true now than they did when he first spoke them. People around the world – but especially on the home front – are, in fact, “either with us or with the terrorists.” The anti-war side of the political leadership in this country, through their “non-binding” attempts to straddle that line, are making their choice of sides crystal clear. Our soldiers, who are paying for that indecision with their lives every day, know this all too well – and the rest of us need to open our eyes and see what they are seeing, before it is too late.
Mr. Emanuel, a special operations military veteran, is a leadership fellow with the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia, where he also studies Classics. In addition, he is a contributing editor for conservative weblog RedState.com, and is a columnist for the Athens, GA Banner-Herald newspaper.
Labels: Democrats, Liberals, National Security, War
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Revisiting the case for racial profiling in the War on Terror
Racial profiling, revisited
Why a key tool in the War on Terror should no longer be ignored
Yet another terrorist attack on the West – this time Great Britain – was narrowly averted earlier this month when nine Muslim men, of combined British and Pakistani origin, were arrested in what the British Home Office called a “nationwide operation” and “a reminder of the real and serious nature of the terrorist threat we [all still] face.”
The plot contrived by these would-be terrorists was, as has been covered here before, to abduct an individual, off-duty British soldier – a male in his early 20s, who had served in Afghanistan – off the streets of Birmingham (about 120 miles north of London, and the site of multiple military hospitals where many wounded British troops are currently receiving inpatient and outpatient care) in broad daylight. The captive was to be filmed being tortured and begging both for his life and for Prime Minister Tony Blair to order a complete withdrawal of British forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. Regardless of Blair’s response, though, the soldier was eventually to be beheaded by his captors – again, on film.
The arrests marked the end of six months of surveillance by MI5, and were carried out at this time because, according to a source in the British security service, the suspects “were ready to go.” Their first target, whose name was (correctly) not released, is now in protective custody, and police are currently in the midst of what West Midlands assistant chief constable David Shaw called a “very, very major investigation” that would take “days, if not weeks” to complete.
Though it no longer seems real to far too many citizens of America, Great Britain, Canada, and much of the rest of the West, the terrorist threat facing us has not gone away, and has, on repeated occasions, shown itself in (largely thwarted, thankfully) plots like this one against each of our nations and their citizens.
As we all remember, last fall British authorities, acting on British, Pakistani, and US-provided information (including “chatter” monitored by the NSA), arrested nearly thirty conspirators who were plotting to take down up to ten airliners over US cities by using liquid-gel bombs which could be detonated by remote electronic device.
The most obvious commonality between this and the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001, was that both involved airliners which were fueled up for long-distance flights. The less obvious commonality (due more to selective reporting than to a dearth of available information) was that, once again, Muslim men of middle-eastern origin or descent were the prime culprits in an international terrorist plot.
The response to this by such organizations as the ACLU, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), and others was, as usual, a hasty warning not to fall into the trap of “racially profiling” young Middle Eastern or Muslim men, as well as an issuance of the well-worn admonishment that “Not all Muslims are terrorists.”
Despite the truth of these words, the frequency with which they must be publicly spoken – seemingly every day – should be a matter of some concern, and should lead a vigilant public (and government) to do more than a bit of thinking about its methods of preventing future terrorist attacks.
Although pointing it out violates the standards of political correctness, it is an inarguable fact that while most Muslims are not terrorists, the vast majority of terrorists are, in fact, Muslim, and of Middle Eastern descent. According to the National Counterterrorism Center’s “Report on Incidents of Terrorism, 2005,” 58.3 percent of terrorist attacks worldwide were carried out by strictly-defined “Islamic extremists” – and that is just the number that was verifiable. Many more were suspected to have been carried out by radical Islamists, but proof of their culpability did not rise to the level necessary for inclusion in the report.
America and the majority of the Western world continue to follow the advice of CAIR and its allies and look the other way rather than address this demonstrable demographic fact and use it to our advantage in the quest to protect against future attacks. Meanwhile, the British, after last fall’s recent brush with what Deputy Commissioner of police Paul Stephenson called “mass murder on an unimaginable scale” (clearly he wasn’t listening to Keith Olbermann on the topic), paid lip service to no longer ignoring this reality, and said that they would be working to implement new airport security methods which take ethnicity and race into account.
Scotland Yard chief Lord Stevens, in an interview with the UK Guardian, said that these protocols include focusing on “people that behave suspiciously, have unusual travel plans or are of a certain religion or ethnicity.”
In short, the British said that they would begin racially profiling the demographic which produces the preponderance of terrorists.
The instinctive recoiling on the part of the politically correct notwithstanding, this decision would make perfect sense. Israel has used this method for years; its national airline, El Al, has a policy of singling out young Arabs for extensive search procedures. As a result, they have gone nearly thirty years without a hijacking.
When there is a demonstrable threat from a particular demographic, then it is only logical that people who fit that profile should receive closer scrutiny. For example, if I rob a bank or convenience store, it would make perfect sense for the police, in their search for the culprit – in this case, a white or Native American male – to be suspicious of other white males, and to target them more closely for possible investigation. It would not make sense, though, for those police to also shake down African-American males, white females, etc., for the sole purpose of not hurting my, or other white males’, feelings. It is similarly illogical for airport security personnel to randomly searching elderly women, young children, and other people who do not even remotely fit the profile of a possible terrorist, for the sole purpose of not offending the Middle Eastern/Muslim population.
The highest-ranking Muslim in British law enforcement, Chief Superintendent Ali Dizaei, has spoken out against the initiative, telling the Guardian that in his opinion, passenger screening “becomes hugely problematic when it's based on ethnicity, religion and country of origin…I don't think there's a stereotypical image of a terrorist."
The problem, though Mr. Dizaei, CAIR, and others refuse to acknowledge it, is that there is, in fact, a “stereotypical image of a terrorist” – and to ignore that truth, simply out of fear of offending people, is to leave ourselves open to greater danger.
Profiling is certainly not the be-all, end-all of national security and counter-terror protocol; after all, it is easy to list terrorists who have either been non-Muslim or non-Middle Eastern. However, for every individual like Richard Reid, Timothy McVeigh, Eric Rudolph, or Jose Padilla who commits (or plans to commit) an act of terror, there are exponentially more terrorists of Middle Eastern descent, such as the 27 arrested in the London liquid-bomb plot, the 19 hijackers from 9/11, the 17 captured in the plot to blow up Canada’s parliament and to behead the Prime Minister, the Madrid bombers, the Bali nightclub bombers, the “Fantastic 4” of the 7/7 bombings in London, the eight arrested this month in Birmingham, and countless others.
While profiling in and of itself cannot ensure the safety of our skies, our motorways, or other aspects of our lives any more than any other individual tactic, it can – and should – be an “alltool” in the figurative tool kit of law enforcement, the TSA, and the general public. It is true that all terrorists are not young Muslim males of Middle Eastern descent. However, until it is no longer the case that far more terrorists fit that description than not, profiling is a tactic which must not only be allowed, but encouraged.
Labels: National Security, Terrorism, War
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Cracking the code
Nonproliferation efforts in an age of nuclear black markets
Though nuclear proliferation was, until recently, thought of by most as being a unilateral, intra-state (or “vertical”) activity, events of recent years – especially since 9/11 – have brought to the public’s attention the presence not only of state-to-state transfers of nuclear technology, but also of non-state actors in international nuclear development. This brings up the question of how to deal with these two types of proliferation.
Nuclear proliferation through interstate transfer is largely self-explanatory. An example is that of North Korea and Pakistan, in which Pakistan provided “blueprints and components for gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment” to the DPRK in exchange for Nodong missile plans from Korea.
The involvement of non-state actors in international nuclear proliferation, though, creates a more widespread, tangled, and potentially more dangerous situation. The idea that rogue individuals could obtain nuclear technology, radioactive material, and technological know-how has long been on the radar screen of the public – again, especially since 9/11 – but estimates of how widespread a “nuclear black market” network could become before being penetrated (or even known about) proved, with the outing of the A.Q. Khan network, to be far more conservative than reality.
Abdul Qadeer Khan, the man “widely viewed as the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons,” was the director of Khan Research Laboratories in Pakistan, and was the leader of the Pakistani uranium centrifuge enrichment program. In 2003, though, while investigating Iran and Libya’s divergent proliferation intentions, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stumbled onto Khan’s illegal proliferation network (three years after the US had learned of it and begun to penetrate its operations) and, like the sweater thread that keeps on coming out as its pulled, further and further revelations came to light regarding the nuclear black market as more light was shone upon it.
In October of 2003, a shipment of uranium-enrichment gas-centrifuge components bound for Libya via a German-owned ship named the China revealed the network’s ongoing activity, and led authorities to take a closer look at the potential complexity of the proliferation market. Further investigation revealed an “illegal nuclear trafficking network” the likes of which had not previously been imagined, and which IAEA director general Mohammed El-Baradei called “the Wal-Mart of private proliferation.”
Continued El-Baradei:
When you see things being designed in one country, manufactured in two or three others, shipped to a fourth, redirected to a fifth, that means there’s lots of offices all over the world. The sophistication of the process, frankly, has exceeded my expectations.That, of course, is quite an understatement. The Khan network was eventually revealed to have provided “blueprints, technical design data, specifications, components, machinery, enrichment equipment, models, and notes on…centrifuges” through transit points and middlemen in nearly thirty countries, including Dubai, Germany, Malaysia, South Africa, Turkey, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Iran, North Korea, and Libya were among the states and organizations revealed to have received nuclear technology and equipment from Khan, and many still suspect that al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan obtained similar assistance before the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Further insight into the network will be difficult to obtain, as Khan, in 2004, was granted a full pardon by the government of Pakistan in exchange for taking sole responsibility for his illegal proliferation efforts – and for keeping his silence as to remaining details forever (a fact which causes many to suspect Pakistani governmental complicity in Khan’s actions).
What is to be done about these two types of proliferation? If Alexander Montgomery, a postdoctoral fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, is correct, the non-state-actor model is not a threat, and A.Q. Khan – despite how breathtakingly widespread it was – was simply a flash in the pan, and, even if it wasn’t, posed relatively little threat to the rest of the world, as the nations and individuals who benefited from the network would eventually have come up with the technology on their own anyway. Further, Montgomery argues that diplomacy and carrots (with nothing but “symbolic” sticks as the alternative) are the solution to all proliferation, and maintains that there is not one nation on earth whose drive for nuclear weapons, or animus toward their enemies, is strong enough to cause them to resist active diplomacy and increasing promise of incentives in exchange for scrapping their nuclear ambitions. As a result, he argues, all talk of “regime change” (which he very irresponsibly claims is used as the sole strategy of proliferation prevention) must go, and be replaced with direct, conciliatory talks with those misunderstood states whom we, apparently incorrectly, think are pursuing nuclear weapons for less-than-pristine reasons.
Another, far more rational argument was put forth in the journal International Security by Chaim Braun and Chris Chyba, who chose to realistically address both proliferating states and non-state actors in terms of both supply-side and demand-side actions, rather than, like Montgomery, simply focusing on demand-side efforts and putting all of their eggs in the basket of carrot-based (or concession-based) diplomacy. As they correctly argued, both interstate proliferation and proliferation rings present broad challenges to the security of nations, as well as to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The threats posed by the nuclearization of less developed countries, often through interstate technology and materiel transfer, are different – and potentially more dangerous – than those posed by larger nations which are more in the public eye. This stems from the opacity of their programs, which limits oversight by more knowledgeable, more experienced nations, from their lack of funding to ensure proper safety measures are taken, and from the combination of their geographic proximity to their rivals and the inherent instability in the regimes of so many smaller, poorer nations.
Modern nonproliferation efforts must adapt to the spread of interstate proliferation, as well as the possibility of larger and more widespread extra-state proliferation rings. The NPT must be strengthened, and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which now provides for the interdiction of materiel shipments when the vessel in question is flying the flag of a nation which has agreed to the Initiative, must be expanded to include more “willing participants.” UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, an unprecedented Section VII resolution (making it legally binding upon all UN member-nations), currently “obliges member states to take action to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, particularly by nonstate actors, through strengthened border controls, better export controls, and other domestic laws.”
As Braun and Chyba point out, UNSCR 1540, though supposedly legally binding, is far from universally enforceable; likewise, though preemptive war against proliferating nations is an option, it would not be cost-effective, both in terms of money and of human life, to use as a primary option even in most cases – even if the preemptive war in Iraq had gone well.
Just as there is no single profile of a proliferating nation or organization, there is no single solution to the problem that is nuclear proliferation. Proliferation rings, like the A.Q. Khan network, have been able to thrive in the past due to the combination of loopholes in export control regimes and a wealth of clients who were willing to defy the NPT. In order to curb proliferation, at the very least, these loopholes must be closed, and demand-side issues must be addressed, with the ultimate goal not only of making nuclear materiel unavailable to potential proliferators, but also of convincing those nations and organizations which would be potential buyers in the nuclear weapons market that their best interests lie elsewhere – and that, should they proceed, the proverbial stick with which they are swatted would be of far greater consequence than the benefit they would gain from ignoring the international nonproliferation regime and proceeding along the path toward nuclear weapons acquisition.
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NOTES
Albright, David and Corey Hinderstein. “Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks.” Washington Quarterly. 2005, 28-2.
Braun, Chaim and Christopher Chyba. “Proliferation Rings New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime.” International Security. 2004, 29-2.
Cirincione, Joseph, et al. Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, 2nd Ed. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005.
Montgomery, Alexander. “Ringing in Proliferation: How to Dismantle an Atomic Bomb Network.” International Security. 2005, 30-2.
Sagan, Scott and Kenneth Waltz. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. 2002.
Labels: Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Security, National Security, Nonproliferation
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"Terrorism Deniers"
"Terrorism Deniers"
Like Holocaust Deniers, only so much cooler
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the portion of the War on Terror which has taken place in view of the public has been largely prosecuted far away from the United States, a fact which positively demonstrates the war’s success thus far in keeping terrorists away from the American homeland. Unfortunately, the remoteness of known combat operations, combined with the lack of terrorist success in the United States, has had a disappointingly negative effect on Americans’ view of the war, and of the terrorist threat that still faces us – despite the fact that terrorist activity has been taking place, and even more attacks have been publicly thwarted, in countries as geographically (and strategically) close to us as Canada, Spain, and Great Britain.There have been several high-profile plots. On March 11, 2004, Islamist terrorists conducted a coordinated bombing attack on the commuter rail system in Madrid, Spain, killing 191 people and wounding a further 1,824. On July 7, 2005, four suicide bombers – known as the “Fantastic Four” to Islamists the world over who cheered their actions – struck three London underground trains and a double-decker bus, killing 52 people and injuring 770. In June of last year, seventeen militant Muslims were arrested north of our border after Canadian law enforcement officials learned that they were not only preparing to conduct a string of terror bombings across the country, but were also plotting “to storm Parliament, take hostages and behead the prime minister.”
In August of 2006, British authorities arrested twenty-five people who were plotting to smuggle liquid explosives aboard airliners bound for the US, with what was thought to be the intention of blowing them up over the Atlantic Ocean. In late October, though, it was revealed that the would-be terrorists’ actual plan was to wait until the passenger-laden aircraft were physically over American cities before detonating them, so as to “maximize the potential loss of life and economic effect.” Terrorism expert and Georgetown University professor Bruce Hoffman said the case “indicated that Islamic extremists remain focused on attacking U.S. cities.”
Unfortunately, there are partisan, professional “Terrorism Deniers” who don’t see it that way – not even close, in fact. To many of the most vocal members of the American Left, the real enemy is not those who would kill us, but the elected President of their country, and the real priority is not fighting terrorists who target them and their families, but rather ridiculing (when not outright attempting to thwart) any actions the Bush administration takes to protect America from future attack.
One prime example of a Terrorism Denier is the Los Angeles Times’s David “Was 9/11 really that bad?” Bell, who wrote that Americans “need to overcome long habit and remind ourselves that not every enemy is in fact a threat to our existence,” and thus abandon our fanciful, farcical “War on Terror.”
Another Denier is Keith Olbermann, former ESPN anchor and current host of MSNBC’s “Countdown.” When not making an inexplicable comparison between Donald Rumsfeld and Neville Chamberlain (while claiming to be the Winston Churchill or the Paul Revere of our generation), Olbermann’s favorite pastime appears to be demanding apologies from the President – who, he has declared, is suffering from “frightening and dangerous delusions” – for innumerable transgressions, including going to war to defeat Islamist terrorism, and endorsing American military tactics which are “all too comparable to the actions of the extremists” (on the rare occasion that he sees fit to acknowledge that there are actually non-American extremists in the world).
“Terrorism is still being sold to the public,” he says, “as if it were a thrilling horror movie and we were the naughty teenagers about to be its victims.”
Lately, Olbermann has added a new trick to his repertoire: reprimanding the President for not showing sufficient proof that terrorist plots (hatched, one would assume, by those same terrorists whose existence he has vehemently denied for years) have actually been stopped over the last five-plus years.
Said Olbermann of the President’s reference to a foiled “al Qaeda plot to plot to fly a hijacked airplane into the tallest building on the West Coast” (the Library tower in Los Angeles), which he disrespectfully described Bush as having “personally revealed so breathlessly a year ago next month”:
It was embarrassing enough that you mistakenly referred to the structure as the “Liberty Tower.” But within hours it was also revealed that authorities in Los Angeles had had no idea you were going to make any of the details – whether serious or fanciful – public.That turn of phrase – and twist of logic – would be impressive were it not so inane. Not two sentences later, Olbermann attempted to shove the entire plot under the rug, saying that it was “one of many al-Qaeda operations that had not gotten very far past the conceptual stage” (which apparently means that it was never actually real).
Who terrorized Southern California that day, Mr. Bush?
Other arrests on American soil just haven’t been glamorous enough for Olbermann, who, for example, derisively referred to what he called “those pathetic arrests outside Miami last year in which a few men wound up getting charged as terrorists because they couldn't tell the difference between an al-Qaeda operative and an FBI informant,” adding that “their “ringleader” seemed to be much more interested in getting his “terrorist masters” to buy him a new car than in actually terrorizing anybody.”
Shockingly, in his quest to debunk the idea of terrorism’s very existence, Olbermann did, in fact, address the London liquid-bomb plot referenced above. Unsurprisingly, it was for the purpose of ridiculing the actual threat posed by what a London police chief called “an attempt to commit mass murder on an unimaginable scale.” Said Olbermann, as though speaking directly to the President (judging by his habitual pomposity, he may well have truly believed that the President was watching):
Turned out, sir, a few of them actually had gone on the Internets to check out some flight schedules. Turned out, sir, only a few of them actually had the passports needed to even get on the planes.It sounds to me like Mr. Olbermann is slightly bitter about no longer being able to take a drink with him onto an airplane – especially since he apparently believes there to have been no threat in the first place.
The plot to which President Bush referred was a plot without bombs. It was a plot without any indication that the essence of the operation – the in-flight mixing of volatile chemicals carried on board in sports drink bottles – was even doable by amateurs or professional chemists.
Olbermann and his fellow liberal Terrorism Deniers, who often cite the words of “intelligence professionals” to back up their downplaying of the threats that face America, do an amazing job of cherry picking – and generalizing about – those statements that they want to hear.
After all, the statements like that of Mark Mershon, head of the FBI’s New York field office – that “it would make your hair stand up to be in the room to hear that presentation” from MI5 on the liquid-explosives case – just don’t fit the template.
And when the real enemy is the President, and the real goal is promoting dissent at all costs, without regard for the lives that stand to be lost, in part, due to their cavalier public attitudes toward genuine threats, the template matters more than anything – including, and especially, reality.
Jeff Emanuel, a Special Operations military veteran, is a Leadership fellow with the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia, where he also studies Classics. In addition, he is a contributing editor for conservative web log Red State, and is a columnist for the Athens, GA Banner-Herald newspaper.
Labels: Liberals, National Security, War
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How to respond to a new nuclear neighbor (who wants what you have)? A brief look at Saudi Arabia.
The threat posed to the Western world by a nuclear Iran has been, and will continue to be, well documented. The purpose of this entry is not to rehash that topic, but to discuss the effect of a proliferating Iran another area.
The tenuous state of affairs which passes for “stability” in the turbulent region that is the modern Middle East has become even more so with the renewed pursuit of nuclear technology – and, likely, nuclear weapons – by Iran. While the area is no stranger to conventional warfare, the presence – and threat – of a nuclear power on their doorstep would be unsettling at least, and potentially deadly at worst, to each of the Middle Eastern nations (not simply to Israel, as erroneous conventional wisdom might suggest).
Let us use Saudi Arabia as our example, and pose this question for discussion: what nuclear strategy should Riyadh adopt to best ensure their nation’s security in the face of a resurgent Iranian nuclear threat?
The Kingdom’s geopolitical and geostrategic setting demonstrates the reason for its security concern. Saudi Arabia, the largest country in the Middle East in land area, has a smaller population than that of Iran and of Iraq (though its population doubled between 1980 and 2004); it also controls 25% of the world’s known oil reserves.
Absent of outside protective alliances, this situation makes Saudi inherently vulnerable to the desire of its more populous neighbors – at the moment, Iran, rather than a non-unified Iraq – for more resources and, thus, for more income. Of all of the nations in the region, Iran may be most in need of the additional oil which the enormous Saudi fields (led by their largest oil field, Gharwar), and superior drilling and refining technology, can provide, as their oil revenues are falling 10-12% annually, due both to outdated equipment for harvesting crude oil (making it more expensive to recover the oil from the ground), and to the drying up of foreign investments in the Iranian economy in response to the state’s rogue attitude toward nuclear proliferation.
Iran has more reason than just oil to be a threat to Saudi Arabia. In a division not fully understood by the West (save, perhaps, the Catholics and Protestants of turbulent Northern Ireland, or, increasingly, to those paying close attention to the current sectarian violence in Iran), the Sunni (85% of Muslims worldwide) and Shi’a (89% of Iran’s population) sects of Islam are irreconcilably – and violently – opposed to each other. A hotbed of institutionalized Wahabbist Islam, and the original homeland of the Sunni Al Qaeda terrorist network, Saudi Arabia is at odds with the Imami Shi'ites of Iran in some key doctrinal areas, such as the Imami belief that the lost “Twelfth Imam” will return only upon the descent of the world into war and crisis – a belief which has caused some to suggest that a nuclear Iran could use that technology to spark a regional conflagration in hopes of summoning the so-called “Twelfth Imam” (a form of messianic figure to Imami Shiites).
Furthermore, ancient history must be taken into account – specifically, the quest for empire which has been a characteristic of the Persian population since nearly one thousand years before Christ. Though empires, and classical imperialism, appear to be a feature solely reserved for the past, history can, and generally will, serve not as an exact guide, but as a precedent for present and future actions – and, in the case of Iran, there has been repeated precedent set of a quest for Empire (most detailed for us in the writings of Herodotus, whose history of the Greeks’ Persian Wars is a preeminent work of Classical literature.
Given these reasons for worry about Iran, it seems natural that Saudi Arabia would seek to counter the current Persian nuclear proliferation policy – which not only threatens their security directly, but also could prompt a nuclear arms race in the region – by establishing a nuclear program of their own. However, except for possibly deterring an invasion by conventional forces, the possession of a nuclear arsenal – or even a latent nuclear capability, like Japan’s in the Far East – would do little to increase the actual security of the Saudi kingdom. The leaders of Saudi Arabia appear to recognize this, and have denied any interest in developing their own reciprocal nuclear program.
There are two major reasons why the use of nuclear weapons on Saudi Arabia by Iran is an unlikely prospect. The first, and far less compelling of the two, is the long-term damage to the area which would result from the use of radioactive weaponry. The second, a geopolitical reason (or “georeligious,” to unofficially coin a term), is that Saudi Arabia is home to both Mecca and Medina, two of the Holy Cities of Islam. While capturing these locations from the Sunni Arabs, and placing them under Shiite Persian control, could be an appealing idea to the leaders of Iran, the best means of achieving this would not be through the use of nuclear weapons, but by means of conventional invasion and occupation.
The slim reality of the Iranian nuclear threat to the security of Saudi Arabia, combined with the time necessary to successfully construct a nuclear weapons program (though, with reciprocal aid from Pakistan, that time might be far briefer than it would be for a nation beginning from scratch), means that the Kingdom can benefit as much – if not more – from relying on its existing alliances, and perhaps from forging new ones – as well as from using the economic weapons at its disposal – than it can from violating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), to which it is a signatory (as are Iran, Iraq, and every other state in the Middle East save Israel, but that is a different matter).
Economically, the Kingdom is even now flexing its muscles a bit, unilaterally increasing production (and thereby driving down oil prices to the tune of a 17% decrease in "the past few months") while steadfastly refusing to acquiesce to calls for a special meeting of OPEC. Riyadh is able to do this without damaging its own economy (while simultaneously crippling that of Iran) because, due to advantages in availability and technology, the Saudis can recover, refine, and distribute oil for under 20% of what it costs Iran to do so. (Iran, in fact, is a net importer of gasoline.) As NBC news has reported:
[Saudi Arabia,] other Sunni-dominated oil producing countries and the U.S. are working together, believing it will hurt majority-Shiite Iran economically and create a domestic crisis for Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose popularity at home is on the wane. The traders also believe (with good reason) that the U.S. is trying to tighten the screws on Iran financially at the same time the Saudis are reducing the Islamic Republic’s oil revenues.
For the Saudis, who fear Iran’s religious, geopolitical and nuclear aspirations, the decision to lower the price of oil has a number of benefits, the biggest being to deprive Iran of hard currency. It also may create unrest in a country that is its rival on a number of levels and permits the Saudis to show the U.S. that military action may not be necessary.
Strategically, the best ally that Saudi Arabia has in its quest for nuclear deterrence against Iran is the United States. As the source of 13.1% of America’s annual oil imports, and a strategic ally in the region, the Kingdom’s survival, and relative stability, is of great value to the world’s superpower. With a relationship which has been said to be “like a marriage from which there is no divorce,” America’s promise of security, and of potential nuclear reprisal should there be a strike carried out, can provide Riyadh with a sufficient indirect defense apparatus that the decision to continue on the course of nonproliferation can be sensibly, and comfortably, made.
To echo the conclusion drawn by Bahgat, “US commitments to defend Saudi Arabia against external threats are solid and are not likely to weaken in the foreseeable future. The American-Saudi unofficial alliance is built on shared interests, not common values. Saudi oil is crucial to the prosperity of the American and world economies, and oil is projected to remain the main source of energy in the next few decades.”
Due to the aforementioned external and internal factors, Saudi Arabia would be best served responding to the potentially increased threat from a nuclear Iran not by implementing a nuclear program of its own, but by continuing to rely on the reciprocity offered by existing alliances with external powers which can better serve to protect the Kingdom from attack, and to deter enemies from considering such action.
NOTES
Bahgat, Gawdat. “Nuclear Proliferation: The Case of Saudi Arabia.” Middle East Journal. Vol. 60: Issue 3. 2006: 421-443.
Bozorgmehr, Najmeh and Roula Khalaf. “Iran admits oil projects suffering.” Financial Times. December 2006.
Energy Information Administration. “U.S. Imports by Country of Origin.” 2006. http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_a.htm
Meyer, Stephen M. The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1983: 1-43.
Von Heyking, John. “Iran’s President and the Politics of the Twelfth Imam.” Ashland, Ohio: Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs. November 2005.
Labels: International Trade and Security, National Security, Nonproliferation
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Breaking down "Weapons of Mass Destruction"
Threat differentials and the necessary foci of nonproliferation strategy.
According to the United Nations, the broad category commonly known as “Weapons of Mass Destruction” (WMD) currently consists (and has consisted since 1947) of “atomic… weapons, radioactive…weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons…which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect.” However, these weapons can be subcategorized, based on their destructive potential, for the purpose of focusing nonproliferation efforts on the most deadly, most “massively destructive” weapons.
While the term "WMD" is still used by the US government to describe the combination of “nuclear, biological, and chemical” arms, other organizations have broken from this convention. In the second edition of the Carnegie foundation’s Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, the term "WMD" was done away with, in favor of specific, by-category reference to nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiation weapons. As the Deadly Arsenals authors explained it, “though used widely by officials and the media, this phrase conflates very different threats from weapons that differ greatly in lethality, consequence of use, and the availability of measures that can protect against them…[and a] failure to differentiate these threats can lead to a seriously flawed policy.”
The rationale behind subcategorizing WMD by destructive power and by victim consequence management capability is readily explainable.
The availability of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons is certainly not identical, nor is the immediate cost in human lives of their use. The relative ease with which chemical-biological (CB) weapons can be developed, attained, and maintained (the latter being more easily done with chemical weapons than biological) is countered by the difficulty involved in effectively weaponizing and deploying them, as well as by the fact that the effects of chemical and biological weapons can be blunted through proper preparation, especially in terms of the pre-positioning of (and quick reaction to provide) proper CB protective suits and decontamination materials (including antibiotics, in the case of biological attack), as well as by limiting the movement of individuals from the contaminated area.
The disparity in preventive and reactive measures, and thus in overall effect, renders nuclear weapons the most easily differentiated type of “WMD.” In the case of nuclear explosives, there is relatively little preventive action that can be taken. Once a nuclear weapon has penetrated an area’s defenses (border security in the case of an imported explosive, a missile defense system in the case of an ICBM or the like, etc.), the only action that can be taken is reactive, and will almost certainly be coming on the heels of a devastating strike which has resulted in massive devastation – both structurally and in terms of human life – in the immediate area of the attack. The fallout from an attack which utilizes nuclear weapons can also render a site contaminated for a significantly longer period of time than a CB attack. While “the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons is broader” than that of their nuclear counterparts, the scope of the devastation which would result from a nuclear assault appears to warrant a greater focus on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons than on CB weapons.
Since the year 2000, nuclear technology, and its accompanying weaponry, has been pursued with increasing vigor by states (Iran, North Korea) which have voiced their intent to act aggressively toward their neighbors, as well as by individuals and extra-state organizations which have done the same. Although the technology is more difficult to come by for the latter (despite the former A.Q. Khan “nuclear black market,” which “spread nuclear weapons technology around the world”), the threat they present can also be seen as graver, as they lack the oversight and checks and balances offered a nation by the international community.
The shifting threat, from entrenched states seeking massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons for the primary purpose of deterrence to “hostile states and terrorists” who may see these weapons as a means to an end, means that a renewed focus must be placed on nonproliferation efforts, and new tactics and strategies must be developed and implemented to better support and enforce the existing nonproliferation regime.
The Carnegie Foundation for International Peace offered what appears to be the most overall coherent, workable strategy for 21st century nonproliferation in its 2005 Strategy for Nuclear Security. The authors of this document stress the need for comprehensive nonproliferation action and policy consisting of such elements as the strengthening of enforcement through new international law, more involvement of the UN Security Council, and a tougher inspection regime, and the lessening of demand through the disarmament of existing nuclear weapons states.
The last measure in the plan to strengthen enforcement calls for “the use of force” in “counter- proliferation and preemption” efforts when needed. “If diplomacy and deterrence fail,” the authors correctly argue, a nation “must have military forces ready to defeat attacks involving unconventional weapons.” While the Carnegie approach as a whole, including this last feature, meshes nicely with the three-pillared strategy laid out in the U.S.’s National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction – counterproliferation, strengthened nonproliferation, and consequence management – the report accuses the U.S. of vastly overemphasizing “military responses to proliferation” at the expense of the other strategic pillars, a point which may have validity depending on the observer’s point of view. A precise balance between the U.S. “pillars” and among the Carnegie recommendations must certainly be struck to provide the most effective means of preventing nuclear nonproliferation. However, once the tactics have been determined, and that balance agreed upon in good faith, the decision must be maintained by those who are party to the decision-making process – a necessity which Carnegie stood on its head with its out-of-hand condemnation of the U.S. action in Iraq, which was the only time that this “use of force” has been employed, and its lamenting that said condemnation does not “appear to have diminished the enthusiasm of proponents of the Iraq war for applying the Iraq model to other problem states” – even though this application is something which these critics themselves called for in their immensely practical, workable strategy for 21st century nuclear nonproliferation.
Further, the reasoning behind this condemnation is presented dishonestly in various publications by the Carnegie contributors. In Deadly Arsenals, Cirincione, et al make the claim that:
First, it goes without saying that "outside acceptance" does not a fact make, and that an intentional misrepresentation is much different from - and more severe than - a de facto "misrepresentation" which comes about as the direct result of the deception of the other party (in this case, Saddam's Iraqi government) or as the result of incorrect conclusions drawn from current and previous evidence and patterns of behavior.In the year prior to the war, U.S. and British officials systematically misrepresented Iraq's weapon capabilities.This last finding is contested by officials in the U.S. and British administrations but is widely accepted outside these governments.
Likewise, the fact that something is "widely accepted" by third parties the world over (or, to be technical, 3rd-through-189th parties) does not render the beliefs of, or statements of belief by, those directly involved as meaningless.
Further, when referring back to the publication from which the beginning of the Deadly Arsenals quote (accusing the US and UK of "systematic misrepresentation") was pulled - Carnegie's Strategy for Nuclear Security - it turns out that the US systematically "misrepresented Iraq's weapons capabilities" by:
Treating nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as a single “WMD threat," [because] the conflation of three distinct threats, very different in the danger they pose,distorted the cost/benefit analysis of the war.In closing, I am struck by the incurable need to point out the fact that, just because Carnegie now eschews the term "WMD" (see second paragraph above), it does not automatically make any others who do still use the term (which has been recognized by the UN since 1947 - see first paragraph above) into liars.
NOTES
Cirincione, Joseph, et al. Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, 2nd Ed. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005.
Cirincione, Joseph, et al. WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004.
McFarlane, Allison. “Audit of the Conventional Wisdom: All Weapons of Mass Destruction are not Equal.” Cambridge, MA: MIT Center for International Studies, 2006.
National Security Council. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. Washington, DC: White House, 2002.
Perkovich, George, et al. Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005.
Labels: International Trade and Security, National Security, War
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A rough start for Robert Gates
Dr. Robert Gates, President Bush's nominee to replace Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, got off to a bit of a rocky start in his role as the perspective administration representative in charge of America's warfighting capability. On Tuesday, in his one day of testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Gates managed to stir up a whirlwind of controversy with a single two-word answer: "No, sir."These words, uttered in response to Senator Carl Levin's (D-Mich.) pointed question, "Do you believe that we are currently winning in Iraq?," set Gates up, in the eyes of both the media and the Democrats, as a welcome opponent to the administration's current point of view on the war, as exemplified by President Bush, who said at an Oct. 25 news conference, "Absolutely, we're winning."
Though he tried to mitigate his position after lunch, saying that he did not want troops to think he believes they failing in their mission, Gates was unable to convince many that his later-adopted stance of "we are neither winning nor losing at this point" was accurate - especially since, when specifically asked by Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) whether he agreed with his statement to Levin, he confirmed his previous response.US and foreign media outlets, including terrorist-friendly Al-Jazeera, immediately ran with Gates's comments under blaring headlines like "Gates: US not winning Iraq war," and in articles which prominently featured a loose quotation of his statement regarding the lack of stability in Iraq, and the potential for a "regional conflagration."
This earned Presidential spokesman Tony Snow some heat at Tuesday evening’s press conference. One reporter asked the press secretary if he thought that it was "demoralizing" for the potential Secretary of Defense "to say to troops out in the field who hear this that America is not winning the war," to which Snow responded:
What I think is demoralizing is a constant effort to try to portray this as a losing mission. You know what you ought to do? You ought to talk to some of the troops when they come back. Give them a call. I think you'll find that they are committed to the mission, and furthermore, you will find that Bob Gates, in his testimony today, did nothing to give the indication that he lacks confidence in either the mission or the people conducting it.Though Gates attempted to further moderate his response by saying, "Our military wins the battles that we fight," and by adding, "Where we're having our challenges, frankly, are in the areas of stabilization and political developments and so on," it was too late to undo what his two-word answer had done.
The administration made a valiant attempt to spin this public comment as the positive that it may prove to be. In his Tuesday evening briefing, Snow said, "There are any number of times...when an advisor may come in and tell a President something that a President may or may not wish to hear, but this is a President who is not afraid of having somebody tell him what they consider to be the truth. As a matter of fact, he welcomes it."
In other words, Gates is a man who is ready and willing to offer his analysis, advice, and fresh ideas on Iraq. With regard to the administration's point of view as stated by the President, Gates is incorrect on the status of an impending victory in the region; however, what may really be missing from this discussion - as has seemingly been the case more often than not of late - is a definition of winning itself.
A former member of James Baker's Iraq Study Group, one thing that Gates was ostensibly hired for was his perspective on - and ideas for a successful conclusion to the situation in - the Middle East. A proponent of direct talks with Iran and Syria, and of seeking a political solution in the region rather than a military one, Gates has critiqued US troop levels in Iraq as too small after the initial invasion, and has also argued for a reduction in the number of forces now in the country as soon as the Iraqis can be reasonably expected to handle their own security.
"In my view, all options are on the table, in terms of how we address this problem in Iraq," Gates told the committee, which approved his nomination by a 24-0 vote after only five hours of testimony.
The quick, unanimous vote was, in part, an "anybody but Rumsfeld" statement by many who viewed the outgoing Secretary of Defense as a symbol of the administration’s stay-the-course attitude in a conflict which has been losing popularity for some time now - despite evidence to the contrary in the form of a classified memo from Rumsfeld to President Bush, sent two days before the election, in which he outlined several new ideas for the prosecution and the publicization of the Iraqi conflict.
Sen. Levin, the rising committee chairman, said that he "voted yes because in both the substance of his answers and the tone of his answers, he seemed open to course correction." Ten other Democrats - including Presidential hopefuls Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.) and Evan Bayh (D-Ind.) - voted in favor of Dr. Gates, which brings up an interesting issue: a year from now, if Iraq policy has not been changed, the situation in the region has not improved, and massive troop withdrawals have not commenced, campaigning Democrats who gave him the rubber-stamp approval after only five hours of questioning may have some pretty serious questions of their own - from their own side - to answer.
As far as the present goes, Snow assured the media and the public that the suggested disagreement between Gates and the President "doesn't exist."
Let's hope that that is, in fact, the case, and that Gates's statement that we are not winning in Iraq - a claim which was immediately echoed far and wide by our enemies - was either a misstatement or a result of the lack of a clear objective in the region, rather than a statement of belief in our armed forces' failure in their mission. For, in the unlikely event that Dr. Gates does believe that we are doomed to failure in Iraq, then, should he be confirmed by the full Senate, the President will have a negative, defeatist voice within his own cabinet, influencing defense policy. The fact that the voice in question will be that of the man who is responsible for leading our Armed Forces to victory in war gives this the potential to be a problem much larger than an opposition-controlled Congress.
Labels: Congress, National Security
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The Iraq Study Group prepares to make its recommendations
A new direction is needed in Iraq.
That statement is agreed to virtually across the board; however, opinions about just what the new direction needs to be - and what steps must be taken to implement it and to succeed - are extremely diverse.
One blue ribbon, bipartisan governmental panel is about to make its own recommendations. The Iraq Study Group, co-chaired by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Democratic Congressman (and 9/11 Commission vice chair) Lee Hamilton, and including Secretary of Defense nominee Robert Gates and former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor among others, was appointed by Congress in March of this year, and has been working since then to come up with policy suggestions for dealing with America's current situation in the middle east.
However, what was ostensibly endorsed by the administration in hopes that a bipartisan endorsement of existing policy could be achieved has instead returned the exact opposite. As one panel member told the Los Angeles Times, "It's not going to be 'stay the course. The bottom line is, [current U.S. policy] isn't working. ...There's got to be another way."
With violence by Islamic extremists on the rise in Iraq, many in Congress - as well in the administration - have become more receptive to alternative suggestions, such as those offered by the highly anticipated commission report, which is expected to be presented early next week.
In their investigation, the Baker-Hamilton commission consulted with the President and other administration officials, with hundreds of foreign policy and Middle Eastern affairs experts, as well as with representatives of Iran and Syria. Its members also spent several days in Iraq earlier this year.
The reality on the ground in Iraq dictates that a new direction be taken. However, early reports of the Baker-Hamilton commission's recommendations are not encouraging.
The commission reportedly focused on three key courses of action going forward in Iraq, with two seriously being considered as viable.
The first proposal, entitled "Stability First," called for continuing to try to stabilize Baghdad, both through increased security and by encouraging violent extremists to enter the political arena as a means of stemming the increasing tide of bloodshed. The plan also calls for working with the neighboring countries of Iran and Syria to end the fighting.
The second, "Redeploy and Contain" - the recommendation most likely to be implemented - includes the negotiation and engagement proposals from the "Stability" plan, while also calling for a phased withdrawal of American troops to bases outside Iraq, from which they would ostensibly be able to deploy once again into the region in the event of reescalating violence or emerging terrorist threat. This recommendation has apparently been decided upon by the commission, complete with a supposedly untimed withdrawal plan for 15 US combat brigades.
The third option, called "Stay the Course, Redefine the Mission," was proposed as an alternative to a quick U.S. withdrawal, but, according to reports, the panel appeared to be uninterested in those plans (unsurprisingly).
Though undoubtedly ascertained in good faith, the commision's recommendations are dangerously unworkable.
The idea of engaging violent extremists by offering a voice in government is one which can only be taken seriously by people who do not understand in the least that there are some people - not defined by demographic, race, or religion, but by their own individual nature - who are not able to be tamed by civilized discourse, or by constructive appeal to their rational side. For those who are indiscriminately slaughtering men, women and children, who are abducting, torturing - and the latest sick fad has been to do so with power drills (links here, here, here, and here. Warning: Extremely disturbing) - and beheading innocent, peaceful civilians, for those who have it in them to douse worshipers at a mosque with kerosene and set them aflame, there is no rational side, no innate civility, to be appealed to. For these people, the only bargaining chip is strength, and the only tool in the tool chest overwhelming violence. The offer of a part in any political process will be wasted at best on those we are fighting.
The suggestion to bring Iran and Syria into the Iraq conflict via invitation - an idea supported by Secretary of Defense nominee Gates - is similarly dangerous. "Neither the Syrians nor the Iranians want a chaotic Iraq," Baker said recently, "so maybe there is some potential for getting something other than opposition from those countries."
The perception that both nations have a vested interest in the region is entirely accurate. However, the Iraq which they have an interest in seeing - and which they have been working toward through their increasing funding and arming of the violent insurgency - would be a nation diametrically opposed to anything in the interest of the West.
Iranian leaders are very willing to assist us in exiting the region – and are chomping at the bit to become more publicly involved – but are interested in doing so in a way that would enhance Iran's regional power, rather than increase the sovereignty of the newly free Iraq.
Moshen Rezai, secretary of the Iranian government's Expediency Council, said, "The kind of service that the Americans…have done us, no superpower has ever done anything similar. America destroyed all our enemies in the region. It destroyed the Taliban. It destroyed Saddam Hussein. ...But the American teeth got so stuck in the soil of Iraq and Afghanistan that if they manage to drag themselves back to Washington in one piece, they should thank Allah."
Reaching out to Iran and Syria would mean significant changes in America’s current foreign policy, as well. "To bring them in, we need to stop emphasizing things like democracy and start emphasizing things like stability and territorial integrity," said James Dobbins, a former U.S. envoy to Afghanistan and a contributor to the commission. "We need to stop talking about regime change. It's unreasonable to think you can stabilize Iraq and destabilize Iran and Syria at the same time."
The requisite abandonment of our current policy of regime change and promotion of democracy in both Iran and Syria would make this an enormous reversal of direction, but would be a necessary one if we decided to request help from Syria and Iran as allies to our Iraq effort.
Following this potential suggestion would be folly. It is beyond unreasonable to think that Iran and Syria, two countries who have done all they can to work against us and our allies - particularly Israel - both in the region and in the United Nations, will want anything close to what we are seeking in the Middle East. The idea that a regime which has repeatedly called for the utter annihilation of Israel and of the United States, and which has been funding and supplying arms to insurgents and sectarians since the immediate aftermath of major combat operations, would want to work for an end which is positive to us is laughable at best, and is deadly at worst. Similarly, Syria has been providing training to bloodthirsty cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army, which has been responsible for a great deal of the upheaval and violence in Iraq; the idea of a convergence between our interests in Iraq, and Syria's, is dismally unrealistic.
Naturally, former President Jimmy Carter thinks direct U.S. talks with Iran and Syria over Iraq are a peachy idea. "This is one of the most counterproductive policies that I've ever known, not to talk to the people who disagree with you unless they agree in advance to everything you demand," he said in a Monday appearance on Good Morning America.
With regard to the suggestion of engaging the insurgents and sectarians in the political process, it is just not realistic to expect that those who choose to brutally kill their countrymen will simply drop their weapons, purge the bloodthirstiness from their hearts, and join civilized society if offered a voice in government.
After meeting with the ISG, President Bush said that he was "not going to prejudge" the panel's recommendations, which are expected next month. However, he did warn against a sudden, major shift in strategy.
"I believe that it's important for us to succeed in Iraq, not only for our security but for the security of the Middle East," he said, adding, "I'm looking forward to interesting ideas."
A new direction in Iraq is needed; that is not in question. However, the Iraq Study Group appears poised to offer recommendations which are no more palatable - or workable - than the status quo itself. Appointed by Congress and endorsed by the administration or not, a panel which recommends a course of action which is tantamount not only to surrender in the region, but to foreign policy suicide, clearly hasn’t done sufficient homework to have its suggestions adopted into policy.
Unfortunately, the nomination of former commission member Robert Gates as Donald Rumsfeld's successor to the SecDef position strongly suggests that the panel's recommendations, workable (or sensible) or not, will be adopted - or, at the very least, will have a proponent very high up in the administration.
Part of the problem with the commission - besides the fact that they have appeared to be falling all over themselves to reach a consensus that Iraq cannot be won, regardless of policy - is the lack of military representation among its members. In response to that, General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has put together his own panel of military leaders, and has resolved to work toward policy and action recommendations which do include a definition of - and an option for - victory.
"Winning is having security in the countries we're trying to help that allows for those governments to function and for their people to function," said Pace. He continued:
I think we have to maintain our focus on what objectives we want for the United States, and then we need to give ourselves a good, honest scrub about what is working and what is not working, what are the impediments to progress, and what should we change about the way we're doing it to ensure that we get to the objective that we've set for ourselves.Sensible - and a definition of the mission's goal which has been sorely lacking of late.
President Bush has reportedly said that he will decide within weeks, rather than months, on Iraq policy going forward. The rest of us can only hope that he will consider the practicality - and the advisability - of the Iraq Study Group's proposals, consult his military leaders, and then make a sound decision.
Labels: National Security, War
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Donald Rumsfeld: Effective Leader, Loyal Ally
November 16, 2006 Last Wednesday, in the wake of the sweeping victory by the Democratic Party in the midterm elections - and in a move long called for by many Democrats - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld resigned. He will remain in the job for several more months, to ensure a smooth transition to his successor - Robert Gates, a former Central Intelligence Agency director who's currently president of Texas A&M University.Coming just more than a week after President Bush told reporters Rumsfeld would be staying "until January 2009," the revelation the secretary was leaving - in a move that had been in the works for several weeks - was made at the worst possible time for Republicans. It came too late to help embattled GOP candidates running in areas unhappy with the Iraq war, and too soon after the Nov. 7 election to be seen as anything but a show of weakness and capitulation by Bush to his political enemies.
The Democratic takeover of Congress may mean Rumsfeld will have to dedicate himself full-time to appearing at investigative hearings while someone else takes the reins of the war, a fact which would support his leaving office sooner rather than later.
However, making concessions - real or perceived - to a party more interested in score-settling than in winning the war, does not inspire confidence in Bush's strength for the final two years of his term. That's especially true in light of Bush's history of political appeasement and compromise in the name of bringing a "new tone" to Washington, something which was a failure from the beginning.
Was it time for Rumsfeld to go? Many obviously thought so - including Bush, at whose pleasure he had served for six years. Certainly Rumsfeld had enemies - in Congress, the media and in the uniformed services. The latter often was mischaracterized as being a result of his supposed unwillingness to listen to senior officers when making decisions. But according to retired Gen. Richard Myers, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - the nation's highest-ranking military officer - nothing was further from the truth.
"I think the pundits get it absolutely wrong," Myers said last week. "I have worked with several secretaries of defense. I have never worked with one that has spent more time with the senior military leadership ... ."
Myers also praised Rumsfeld's loyalty to the military. "If you go back and read a little bit about Abu Ghraib and people wanting to place blame, it would have been easy for the secretary of defense to deflect it ... He never did that."
The enemies Rumsfeld had in the Department of Defense and the flag officer corps were, in large part, made as a result of his effort to modernize and streamline the heavy, bloated military machine into a 21st century fighting force.
"(T)o drag the Department of Defense out of the Cold War into the 21st century ... takes enormous physical energy. It takes enormous intellectual effort," Myers said. "But the secretary had the energy, the perseverance and the vision, and he had the support of the senior military. ... I would say that in his tenure ... the department has undergone more profound change in the last six years than in any time in its history since the National Security Act of 1947, and I think history will record that."
Perhaps. But Rumsfeld's place in history will, for better or worse, be determined by the outcome of the current struggle in Iraq.
Despite his shoddy treatment at the hands of the Bush administration, and regardless of what happens from this point on, Rumsfeld has had a tremendous career in public service.
Beginning as the youngest secretary of defense in the nation's history, and finishing as the oldest, Rumsfeld will depart having held the office longer than any other occupant, and being the only man to serve twice in the post. His legion of aphorisms, from "known unknowns," to "you go to war with the army you have," have entered the popular consciousness.
What the future holds is, to loosely quote Rumsfeld, an "unknown unknown." There are difficult decisions to be made about Iraq and the other fronts in the war on terror. Though he will no longer be part of that decision-making, what Rumsfeld said on the eve of the Iraq war must hold true now and in the future: "Win, lose or draw, we're all in this together - and we'll stand together as we take on this adversary."
When announcing the resignation, Bush singled out Rumsfeld's loyalty as one of his most important contributions to the Bush administration. With the newly elected Democratic majority taking office in January and seeking blood over the Iraq war, the president soon may have cause to value that loyalty more highly than ever.
• Jeff Emanuel, a Special Operations military veteran who served in Iraq, is a senior at the University of Georgia.
Published in the Athens Banner-Herald on 111606
Labels: National Security, War
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Defensive missile program makes perfect sense for country
September 21, 2006 Missile defense, a staple of Republican national security policy since the Reagan years, has in recent weeks moved closer than ever to becoming reality.On the Friday before Labor Day, a missile fired from Alaska was destroyed by an interceptor fired from several hundred miles away, thus successfully completing the toughest test to date of the Ballistic Missile Defense system. In a Pentagon briefing the next day, Air Force Gen. Trey Obering said, "Short of the North Koreans firing on us, this test was as real a simulation of the system's effectiveness that we could attempt."
The rationale behind a solid, functional Ballistic Missile Defense system is obvious in this age of rogue nations, dictators and imperialistic powers teaming up to threaten Western civilization.
North Korea, long suffering under a madman dictator, has a missile that can reach the western coast of the United States. Like North Korea, Iran is pursuing development of the nuclear material necessary to make strategic weapons infinitely more deadly - and Iran has access to missile technology from China. Hugo Chavez's Venezuela is a growing threat, as well.
North Korea's response to the successful BMD test said everything we should need to hear to know America is doing the right thing in pursuing this defensive technology. The test "was aimed at attacking us and intercepting our missiles," complained the Korean government via KCNA, the country's state-run news outlet, the day after the successful exercise. This "clearly shows that it is the U.S. which is increasing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and threatening war against our country," the KCNA further noted.
Having bankrupted and starved its citizens in pursuit of a military far beyond its resources - and needs - North Korea is facing the prospect that one large, powerful and very expensive weapon is in very real danger of being rendered completely useless. That's a giant blow to the rogue nation's ambitions.
North Korea's ire makes those ambitions very clear. What explanation can there be for North Korea, or any other country, to have a serious objection to the United States' Ballistic Missile Defense system, besides wishing us harm, or wanting other nations to be able to hold America, the greatest force for good in the world, in check?
On the domestic front, BMD protects all Americans, regardless of race, creed or political affiliation; as the system is further improved, we all benefit. With this taken into account, the strident opposition to our implementation of any form of missile defense on the part of some Americans belies an inexplicable longing for the days of Mutually Assured Destruction, and the wish there was still a counterweight to the United States with opposite values and equal destructive power - namely, something to fill the void left by the Soviet Union's late 20th-century demise.
While it is true MAD worked, to an extent, as a deterrent during the Cold War, there is one glaring deficiency in relying on it for survival: Each side depends, at all times, on complete rationality on the part of the other side. In other words, each side's survival depends on the prevailing of cooler heads every single time a situation gets a bit testy. The opposition must have leaders who at all times subscribe to - and care about - the fact they and their own people will perish, along with their enemies, as a result of their launching an attack.
Therein lies the problem. It would be beyond foolish to blindly trust that North Korea's Kim Jong-Il, Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khameni and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Venezuela's Chavez and others will put their anti-Western, imperialistic desires and their histories of violent irrationality, behind them.
In this age of increasing global threats, Ballistic Missile Defense has the potential to make America safer and more secure. Likewise, the terrorists and dictators who despise the West with every fiber of their being are not going to change their minds as a result of any attempts on our part to appease them. In light of these facts, why would those not opposed to America's continued prosperity - or, for that matter, its continued existence - stand against development and employment of BMD as a tool in our quest to protect our nation and its people to the utmost?
Jeff Emanuel, a Special Operations military veteran who served in Iraq, is a senior at the University of Georgia.
Published in the Athens Banner-Herald on 092106
Labels: National Security
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